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Remedies and Penalties for Wildcat Strikes:
How Arbitrators and Federal Courts Have Ruled
Morrison* and Marjorie L. Handsaker**
The typical wildcat strike is one in which the workers in a strong display of
protest walk off their jobs in the hope of correcting something they believe
unjust. They ignore the established methods for dealing with complaints
and thus precipitate an unauthorized work stoppage. These strikes are by
no means as common in the United States as in some foreign countries
(Great Britain for example). Nevertheless, they occur with sufficient fre-
quency in the United States to warrant careful study.
The No-Strike Clause, Arbitration, and Wildcat Strikes
The wildcat strike represents a violation by the strikers of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The vast majority of agreements in the United States
provide for final and binding arbitration of unresolved disputes over the in-
terpretation and application of the agreement. Usually the agreement to ar-
bitrate these grievances is accompanied by an explicit clause providing that
there will be no strikes or lockouts for the duration of the agreement. This
clause, usually referred to simply as a "no-strike" clause, is considered a
quid pro quo for the agreement to arbitrate. The close relationship be-
tween the two clauses is expressed by the Supreme Court in Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills.' The union gets the right to bring grievances to a neutral
third party for final determination, and the company gets assurance of unin-
terrupted production. Even where there is no explicit "no-strike" clause,
the Supreme Court has held that the existence of an arbitration clause im-
plies the existence of the no-strike clause.
2
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Catholic University Law Review
The Options Open to the Employer
When a wildcat strike violating such a no-strike clause occurs, the employer
has several options open to him. The first option often followed by the em-
ployer is to take no action beyond doing whatever he can informally-often
with the help of local or international union officials-to get the workers
back on the job.
Frequently, however, the employer, in addition to taking such informal
action, elects to follow one of several other courses open to him.
(1) He may secure, or attempt to secure, injunctive relief to
compel the strikers to return to work.
(2) He may bring suit for damages suffered by reason of the
wildcat strike.
(3) He may take disciplinary action against some or all of the
employees engaging in the strike. This appears to be the most
common type of action when any action is taken beyond the in-
formal effort to get the workers to return to work.
He may, of course, elect to follow more than one of these courses of action.
This article shall discuss the three options set forth above. First, the im-
position of discipline by the employer against employees involved in the
strike will be considered in detail. Particularly we shall examine the action
taken by arbitrators when discipline against wildcat strikes is protested by
unions and the discipline is the subject of an arbitration award.
Secondly, employers' actions for damages either in the courts, or through
arbitration, will be discussed.
Finally, consideration will be given to injunctive relief as a remedy for
wildcat strikes, dealing especially with the decision of the U. S. Supreme
Court in the Boys Markets case. 3
The Development of Principles of Discipline
It should be recognized at the outset, of course, that there is no stare decisis
in labor-management arbitration cases. The decision of one arbitrator is
never binding on another. A number of principles have been established,
however, by arbitral decision and are now generally agreed upon by com-
panies, unions, and arbitrators. This forms a body of what approaches
common law. It is one of the aims of this article to set forth these principles.
Companies and unions involved with discipline for wildcat strikes cannot
safely disregard these principles, and any party engaging in such disregard
is almost certain to lose if the question of the propriety of discipline for such
a strike is presented to an aribtrator.
3. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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It is the hope of the authors that this study may be useful to companies
and unions and to their advocates in a multitude of situations. The variety
of contract clauses that may be used in this general area will be enumerated.
The situations in which arbitrators are likely to sustain discipline and the
situations in which it is likely that the arbitrator will modify or revoke the
discipline will be indicated. It is also the authors' hope to indicate to com-
panies and unions ways in which the occurrence of wildcat strikes may be
minimized.
The Ingredients of the Problem
In discipline cases involving wildcat strikes and in arbitration cases con-
cerning the propriety of such discipline, the major ingredients are (1) the
no-strike clause, (2) the arbitration clause, and (3) the discipline clause in
the agreement. As it shall be seen, there is a great variety in all three of
these key clauses in different collective bargaining agreements. The inter-
action of these three clauses, taken in conjunction with the facts in the par-
ticular case, will largely determine the outcome of the arbitration proceed-
ing.
A Preliminary, Synthetic, Example
At the onset, it may be helpful to those who are not familiar in detail with
discipline, arbitration, and collective bargaining agreements to present a typ-
ical case. The reader who is a practitioner in the field may wish to move
rapidly over this hypothetical illustration which is synthesized from a variety
of actual cases.
The workers in an industrial plant may become very disturbed over some
real or fancied grievance. It may be that some disciplinary action has been
taken against a union officer. It may be that the employer has been, in the
minds of the workers, very slow in dealing with some complaint they have
made. It may be that a rumor which is quite without foundation has gone
around the plant. Whatever the cause, there is a feeling among the workers
that direct action must be taken and the workers walk out.
This is clearly a violation of the no-strike clause. There is an alternative
course which the workers should have followed. Typically the agreement
provides a procedure for the handling of complaints. This procedure usual-
ly starts at the grass roots level in a discussion between the worker, his union
shop steward, and the department foreman, who is the management repre-
sentative at the first step. If the grievance is not resolved at this level, it
usually proceeds through two or three additional steps with higher officials
dealing with the question for the union and the company.
If it is still not resolved, the moving party, typically the union, may then
make a demand for arbitration of the issue. An impartial third party is se-
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lected (in one of several ways) to hear the case. He holds a hearing mod-
eled to an extent on court-room procedures, but somewhat less formal, and
issues a final and binding award.
In our illustration, however, the workers elected to disregard both the no-
strike clause and the grievance procedure ending in arbitration. As soon as
the company is aware of the wildcat strike, company representatives typical-
ly notify the local union officials (if they are not already aware of it) and
also the international union representatives. Usually the latter, and often
the former, officials will immediately notify the workers that the walkout is
in violation of the no-strike clause of the agreement and will attempt to get
the stoppage ended at once.
Frequently the company will then mete out discipline (discharge or a dis-
ciplinary suspension involving a certain amount of lost work and pay) to the
instigators of the wildcat strike. Sometimes the discipline extends beyond
the leaders of the walkout to some or all of the workers who participated.
When such discipline is imposed by the company, the union may then
file a grievance concerning the propriety of the discipline and carry the mat-
ter to arbitration. The arbitrator may sustain the discipline, revoke it en-
tirely, or (if he is permitted to do so by the terms of the agreement) he may
modify it: for example, he may reduce a discharge to reinstatement without
back pay for time lost.
Strikes During the Life of Agreements
There are no comprehensive figures concerning the number of wildcat
strikes which occur in the United States annually. But the United States
Department of Labor did report on the total number of work stoppages in
the United States during 1968, and also the number of stoppages during the
term of a collective bargaining agreement. The total number of stoppages
was 5,045; these involved 2,649,000 workers and 49,018,000 man days lost.
Of this total, 1,585 stoppages occurred during the life of an agreement; this
was 31 percent of the total number of stoppages. Stoppages during the life
of an agreement involved 724,200 workers (27 percent of the total) and
4,875,800 man days lost (9.9 percent of the total).4
Not all these stoppages during the life of an agreement, however, were
wildcat strikes. A number of agreements have limitations on the no-strike
clause and the arbitration clause. In some major automobile agreements,
for example, grievances over production standards are not subject to arbitra-
tion and, therefore, are not subject to a no-strike clause. If a grievance over
4. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1646,
ANALYSIS OF WORK STOPPAGES, 1968, 47-48 (1970). It should be noted that these
BLS statistics cover only walkouts involving six or more workers.
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a production standard is not settled in the course of the grievance procedure,
it is a "strikeable" item; such a stoppage, of course, is not a violation of the
agreement. There is no way to determine precisely from the Bureau of La-
bor Statistics figures how many of the stoppages during the life of an agree-
ment are unauthorized, and how many are legal strikes over non-arbitrable
grievances.
Some indication, in a very general way, may be secured indirectly from
the fact that in agreements covering 5,000 workers or more in 1970, 108
agreements covering 1,555,550 workers had complete bans on all stoppages
during the life of the agreement. There were contract provisions which pro-
hibited stoppages, except under given circumstances or for specific issues, in
116 agreements covering 2,261,875 workers. 5
Arbitrator's Awards in Wildcat Cases
To obtain a broad sample of arbitrator's decisions in cases of discipline
meted out for wildcat strikes, the authors studied the awards and opinions
reported in Labor Arbitration Reports, Volumes 31 through 55, published
by the Bureau of National Affairs, Washington, D.C. These volumes cover
the awards reported from September, 1958 through February, 1971. Two
hundred and twenty cases dealing with discipline for wildcat strikes were
covered by this reporting service during this period of time, and these cases
form the basis for the following statistical and analytical material.
This article now turns to the question: to what extent have arbitrators
supported the disciplinary action taken by employers against workers in-
volved in wildcat strikes? It should be noted initially that the discipline
taken by employers falls generally into three categories: employees may be
discharged (often after a suspension pending investigation); employees may
be given suspensions or disciplinary layoffs, the length of which varies great-
ly from a day or two to a period of months. Finally workers may be given
written reprimands (the lightest penalty, of course) and these warnings are
noted in their personnel records.
The following tables show, both for cases and for individuals involved in
cases, what the disciplinary action taken by employers was, and whether the
action taken by employers was sustained, modified, or revoked entirely
when the propriety of the employer's action was ruled upon by an arbitrator.
As discussed in detail below many factors influence the decision of the
5. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1686,
CHARACTERISTICS OF AGREEMENTS COVERING 5,000 WORKERS OR MORE 66 (1970).
The BLS also analyzed in greater detail, no-strike, no-lockout provisions in 1717
collective bargaining agreements, 1966. MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, BULL. No. 1425-6, 83-89 (1966). A summary of these
findings is included below in the section which gives examples of these clauses.
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arbitrator in sustaining, modifying, or reversing the discipline meted out by
an employer. Among these factors are the nature of the no-strike clause,
the evidence presented concerning the employee's alleged connection with
the wildcat strike, and the authority given to the arbitrator by the arbitration
clause in the agreement.
TABLE I
ARBITRATORS' RULINGS ON DISCIPLINE
IN 220 WILDCAT STRIKE CASESa
Cases Involving Discharge
Number of Discharge Lesser Penalty Workers Reinstated
Casesb Sustained Substituted With Full Back Pay
133 84 62 17
Cases Involving Suspensions
Number of Suspension Lesser Penalty Worker Given
Casesb Sustained Substituted Full Back Pay
74 52 9 25
Cases Involving Lesser Penalties
Number of Penalty Penalty
Casesb Sustained Eliminated
19 11 9
a Source: Labor Arbitration Reports, Bureau of National Affairs, Volumes 31-55.
All cases indexed under Topics No. 118.6600 to 118.6609, September, 1958 to
February, 1971, are included.
b One case may involve more than one type of discipline, and an arbitrator's award
for a case may sustain discipline for some employees, while modifying or eliminating
discipline for others. For this reason the case count total exceeds 220, and in each
type of discipline the distribution of actions by the arbitrator exceeds the number
of cases in that type of discipline.
TABLE II
ARBITRATORS' RULINGS ON DISCIPLINE
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Number of Arbitrators' Rulings
Workers Lesser
Number of Suspended Suspension Penalty Worker Given
Casesb by Employer Sustained Substituted Full Back Pay
41 345 308 11 26
a Source: Labor Arbitration Reports, Bureau of National Affairs. The sample in-
cludes all cases under Topics Nos. 118.6600 to 118.6609, Volumes 31-55, for which
number of employees disciplined was reported.
b One case may involve more than one type of discipline, and an arbitrator's award
for a case may sustain discipline for some employees, while modifying or eliminating
discipline for others. For this reason the case count exceeds 146.
TABLE III
NUMBER OF CASES IN WHICH A GIVEN













































a In the 63 cases in which a single worker only was discharged, the discharge was sus-
tained by the arbitrator in 30 cases, modified in 25 cases, and revoked entirely in 8
cases.
b In the 16 cases in which a single worker only was suspended, the suspension was sus-
tained by the arbitrator in 11 cases and revoked entirely in 5 cases.
c In the 7 cases in each of which more than 19 workers were discharged, there were a
total of 313 persons discharged. Of these 313, the arbitrator sustained the discharge
for 276 workers, modified it for 36, and revoked it entirely for 1.
d In the 5 cases in each of which more than 19 workers were suspended, there were a
total of 232 workers suspended. Of these 232, the arbitrator sustained the penalty
in 223 cases and revoked it entirely in 9.
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The following conclusions may be drawn from the foregoing tables: in
the cases which went to arbitration, discharge is the most frequent penalty
imposed by employers upon workers who lead or engage in wildcat strikes.
In both the number of cases and the number of persons involved in cases
which reach arbitrators, discharges are approximately twice as frequent as
suspension.
In the majority of cases, arbitrators have upheld whatever discipline has
been meted out by employers. When the number of cases is considered, ar-
bitrators upheld discharges in 63 percent of the cases and suspensions in 70
percent. In terms of the number of employees involved, discharges were
sustained for 75 percent of the disciplined employees and suspensions were
sustained for 89 percent of the disciplined workers.0
Causes of Wildcat Strikes
The causes of wildcat strikes are many and varied. There has been discus-
sion in the literature as to whether they are the result of building tensions,
whether they are "spontaneous" or led, and if led, whether by union officers
and shop stewards, or by one or more aggressive rank and file workers.
7
Arbitrators become involved in only a fraction of wildcat strike cases, and
when they do, the decisions may be unpublished. Published cases do, how-
ever, frequently give information on the incident which triggered the wild-
cat strike." Sometimes they also indicate past events which built up tension.
Something of value can be learned from a study of causes cited in some of
these cases.
1. Small Incidents the Precipitating Factor.
In a Ford Motor Co. case, 9 an operator contended that his machine was un-
safe. He was replaced with a relief operator whose access to the machine
was later blocked by the local union president and four committemen.
6. In The Long Pause, 14 LAB. L.J. 276 (1963), Attorney Robert Lewis urges that
the parties delete arbitration and "no-strike" clauses from collective bargaining agree-
ments because (among other reasons) arbitrators do not uphold the right of employers
to discharge persons involved in wildcat strikes. The figures cited above certainly con-
tradict the contention of Mr. Lewis concerning arbitrators' decisions and cast serious
doubt upon his proposed elimination of the no-strike clause and the arbitration clause
from collective bargaining agreements.
7. For sociological and psychological analyses of wildcat strikes, see A.W.
GOULDNER, THE WILDCAT STRIKE: A STUDY IN WORKER MANAGEMENT RELATIONSHIP
1965 (Reprinted from Antioch Press 1954).
For additional material on discipline see PHELPS, DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN THE
UNIONIZED FIRM (1959).
8. See STONE, LABOR GRIEVANCES AND DECISIONS (1970).
9. 41 Lab. Arb. 609 (1963).
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These five workers were disciplined, and their discipline led to a wild-
cat strike which lasted nine days, idled 47,000 Ford workers in 31 plants,
and resulted in loss of production of 33,700 cars and trucks. It was later
determined by the Company and the Union that the machine was not unsafe.
In a Masonite Corp. case, 10 a union shop steward was asked to move an
employees' lunch table which had been obtained by going to the third step of
the grievance procedure. He refused and was given a suspension. (The
Company had wanted to use the space temporarily to clean up a machine
before delivery to a customer.) This incident led to a wildcat strike which
eventually resulted in the discharge of 30 workers. When these discharges
were taken to arbitration they were sustained.
2. Rumors Leading to Wildcat Strike.
In an Acme Boot Co. case," an employee refused to accept a job assignment
and said she would rather go home. When she was taken to an office for a
conference about this, several employees, believing she was going to be dis-
charged, left their work stations. By mid-morning most of the employees
had walked out. The discharge of the shop steward and five others who led
the walkout was sustained by the arbitrator.
In an unpublished case related to the authors on condition that it not be
identified, a worker at the start of a shift asked his foreman for permission to
see his shop steward in order to file a grievance. The foreman reminded the
worker that it was the custom in the plant for such business to be transacted
during the mid-morning coffee break and the worker agreed that he would
follow the usual custom. In some way, however, this conversation was re-
ported through the department as a denial by the foreman of the right of the
worker to talk to the steward. This triggered a wildcat strike which eventu-
ally led to the discharge of all 50 of the workers in the department. The
collective bargaining agreement stated that in case of a wildcat strike the em-
ployer could "in his discretion" discharge all participants. In the light of this
sweeping power given to management an arbitrator upheld all of the dis-
charges.
3. Misinterpretation of Company Action and Poor Communication.
In a Philips Industries case, 12 a management consultant spent several weeks
studying production records to plan work flows. At the same time there
was a controversy over a unilaterally determined incentive scale and the
10. 54 Lab. Arb. 633 (1970).
11. 52 Lab. Arb. 585 (1969).
12. 45 Lab. Arb. 943 (1965).
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workers incorrectly thought that the consultant's work would adversely affect
their incentive earnings. When the company learned that a wildcat strike
over the incentive issue was about to break out, it explained the work-flow
study to the union officials. Nevertheless, an eight day strike did occur,
and the arbitrator upheld the discharge of 19 workers including some union
officials.
Sometimes inaccessibility of a management official at a time when a
union officer or shop steward needs information, or a delay in getting a rul-
ing on some point, contributes to a walk-out. 3 Poor communication can al-
so take another form. In one instance a shop steward gave very inadequate
reports on the progress of a grievance, and in another the chairman of the
shop committee gave completely erroneous information to his fellow com-
mitteemen,' 4 and there were resulting violations of the no strike clause.
4. Company Action Held in Part Responsible.
In a Bamford Motor Coach Lines case,' 5 the union president wanted time
off for union business. This was denied by the company. A wildcat strike
ensued and the union president was discharged. The arbitrator ruled that
the union president had the right to the time off and that, since it was im-
properly denied him, the company was partly to blame for the strike. The
discharged president was reinstated without back pay.
Poor supervision seems to have contributed to walk outs in various other
cases. For example, women who had already worked many hours overtime
on previous days processing chickens and who complained of fatigue and
sore hands finally stopped work at the end of eight hours while there were
still some chickens on the assembly line.' 6 In still another case, a plant
superintendent was said to have used harsh and obscene language in re-
proving women shoe workers. 7 This led to a walkout. Discharges in these
cases were modified by the arbitrators.
5. Working Conditions.
In a Donegal Steel Foundry case,' 8 a group of workers, who went home
when there was no heat in the foundry on a day when the temperature out-
side was zero degrees were denied pay for the day and were given warning
13. Pneumatic Prod. Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 986 (1962).
14. Wellman Bronze & Aluminum Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 212 (1962), and E.B.
Wiggins Oil Tool Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 153 (1961).
15. 32 Lab. Arb. 753 (1959).
16. Armour Creameries, 31 Lab. Arb. 291 (1958).
17. Royal Shoe Mfg. Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 469 (1969).
18. 37 Lab. Arb. 1001 (1961).
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notices by the company. The arbitrator found that this was not a wildcat
strike because there was no concerted action among the men; rather the de-
cision to leave was made by each worker individually. They were awarded
call-in pay and the warning notices were rescinded.
In an Insulrock Co. case, 19 the arbitrator upheld the discharge of a group
of workers who participated in a wildcat strike in protest of unhealthy and
unsafe working conditions. The arbitrator conceded that conditions were
bad but held that this was not a reason for a strike in violation of the agree-
ment; He stated that it would be hard to find a more serious breach of the
agreement than a wildcat strike.
6. Employee Unrest Because of Discipline of Workers.
There are many instances of work stoppages called to protest discipline al-
ready meted out to workers. The leaders of the walkout frequently receive
much more severe penalties than were given to those for whom the protest
was made. In a Pittsburgh Steel Co. case, 20 two workers refused a work as-
signment contending it was not in their job description. The two workers
were given a disciplinary suspension which was later converted after the
walkout to discharge. In response to the initial suspension almost the entire
work force in the shipping department walked out in protest, and later all
the workers in the tube department refused to come to work. The 36 work-
ers who participated in the walkout were given a six month suspension.
The arbitrator reinstated without back pay the two men discharged and also
the 36 who were suspended. At that time they had been off work about two
months. The arbitrator wrote forcefully about the failure of the strikers to
use the grievance procedure. He found, however, that the two men who
were discharged were treated too severely in view of good work records and
in view of the fact that both admitted their error in not accepting the work
assignment.
In an unreported case given to the authors with the understanding the
parties would not be identified, a worker was given three days off for failing
to report that he was going to be absent on a certain day. The reason for his
absence was that his daughter was in critical condition in the hospital.
When the fellow workers learned of this three day suspension, they felt that
it was most unjust in view of the problem with his daughter's health, and
they walked out asking that the penalty be rescinded. The company dis-
charged two union officers on the grounds that they instigated the strike.
19. 39 Lab. Arb. 169 (1962).
20. 34 Lab. Arb. 598 (1960). See also Acme Boot Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 585 (1969)
and companion cases 52 Lab. Arb. 1043, and 52 Lab. Arb. 1047 (1969)
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Since the evidence persuaded the arbitrator that the two discharged workers
had, in fact, been the leaders, their discharge was sustained.
7. Union Dissatisfaction with the Operation of the Grievance Procedure.
In a Drake Manufacturing Co. case, 21 an important factor in precipitating a
wildcat strike, in the words of the arbitrator, was the following:
Testimony indicated that for at least several weeks prior to the
meeting there was a good deal of unrest because of employees' dis-
satisfaction with Management's handling of grievances, seniority,
incentive and disciplinary matters.
8. Past History of Illegal Strikes.
When there have been a number of walkouts in the past, there appears to be
a greater tendency to resort to "self-help" rather than to the grievance pro-
cedure when there is a new cause for complaint. 22 This is especially true if
there have been no penalties or relative light penalties in the past. There
can also be ignorance of the possibility of severe penalties. 23
9. Difficulties Arising From a First Agreement.
After a first agreement between a company and union is signed, the stresses
and strains of the new relationship may lead to wildcat strikes. In a Way-
cross Sportswear, Inc. case,24 the first contract stated that a union represen-
tative could visit the plant on a "bi-monthly" basis. The newly established
union believed that this gave the representative of the international union the
right to visit the plant twice a month. When the representative was ejected
from the plant on one of his visits, a wildcat strike was triggered.
In one sense, of course, every wildcat strike is "caused" by the workers'
disregard of the no-strike clause and of the grievance procedure as the prop-
er way to get action on complaints. Precisely why there is this disregard is
not always clear. The foregoing "causes" do, however, shed some light.
Views Concerning the Seriousness of Wildcat Strikes
As discussed above the arbitration clause is commonly considered as a quid
pro quo for the no-strike clause. Employers value very highly the guarantee
of uninterrupted production contained in the no-strike clause. A violation
21. 41 Lab. Arb. 732, 733 (1963). There are a number of other instances of com-
plaints of the slowness of the grievance procedure.
22. Examples are M.L.S. Indus., Inc., 53 Lab. Arb. 75 (1969), and American Air
Filter Co., 47 Lab. Arb. 129 (1966).
23. Royal Shoe Mfg. Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 469 (1969).
24. 53 Lab. Arb. 1061 (1969).
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of this clause is, therefore, looked upon with great severity by employers.
Many union officials and virtually all arbitrators share this view.
Typical of the union officials' views are the following:
Mr. James Hoffa, then International President of the Teamsters Union, on
August 29, 1963, sent a letter addressed to all officers and stewards of
Teamsters Local Union 804. This local at the time was engaging in a wild-
cat strike against United Parcel Service, Inc. in New York City. Mr. Hof-
fa's letter read in part as follows:
These unauthorized stoppages are not only in violation of the
contract, but they also represent an exercise of authority by stew-
ards which is beyond their power under the contract and which
subjects them to removal from office under Article 9, Section 2
of your Local Union Bylaws.
I feel it is my duty to warn all officers and stewards that a
continuation of this type of unjustifiable activity cannot be toler-
ated by the International Union and should not be tolerated by
the Local Union.
Additionally, of course, the members and stewards who are
involved in these unauthorized contractual violations must be
aware that neither the Local Union nor the International Union are
in any position to protect their jobs, their job rights or their senior-
ity when they engage in these unlawful activities.
It is my request that . . . duplicate copies of this letter be
...posted on all union bulletin boards so that the stewards and
the membership may be informed of the seriousness of the situa-
tion and the possible consequences of any further unauthorized
work stoppages in the future. 25
A statement containing the views of a well known arbitrator and of one of
the leading trade union officials in the United States is contained in the
A. M. Byers Co. case. In this case Arbitrator Clair V. Duff stated in his
award:
In essence, a Labor Agreement is a part of a system of indus-
trial self-government. Where the parties have mutually agreed
that there shall be no strikes or work stoppages and that no em-
ployee shall participate in any such activities, an employee who
acts contrary to such contractual provision commits a serious of-
fense. On July 15, 1947 the late Philip Murray, then U. S. W.
President, publicly issued this apposite statement:
"I regard the collective bargaining agreement we have with our
companies not only as a bond but also as a sacred commitment
* * * There should not-there must not-be any evasion of
sacred obligations * * *,26
25. See United Parcel Serv., Inc., 47 Lab. Arb. 1100, 1101 (1966).
26. 31 Lab Arb. 210, 213 (1958).
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Pertinent Contract Clauses
Whether a work stoppage during the life of a collective bargaining agree-
ment is a wildcat strike can be ascertained in any individual case only by
studying one or more of several clauses of an agreement. Although the
pertinent provisions may appear in different clauses in different agreements,
the usual governing clauses are the strike and lockout bans and the griev-
ance and arbitration procedures. In addition, it may be necessary to ex-
amine the management's rights clause, the discipline clause, and sometimes
supplementary rules. Since refusal to work overtime, slowdowns, union
meetings called during working hours, absences especially during the exist-
ence of a picket line, and concerted reporting of lateness or illness have also
been construed to be work stoppages, a number of other clauses in the
agreement may need study.27
Whether a work stoppage is in violation of the agreement depends not
only on interpretation of these clauses, but also on other factors such as lack
of authorization by the union, allegations of unfair labor practice, etc.
1. No-Strike, No Lockout Clauses.
In general, the no-strike clause applies to the area covered by the grievance
and arbitration procedure. In some cases there are complete bans on
strikes and lockouts for the life of the agreement. In other cases there is no
specific no-strike clause, but it is implied from the existence of a grievance
27. The types of activity which have been the basis for disciplinary action by em-
ployers under the no-strike ban are further illustrated in the following cases. In some
instances the discipline was sustained, in others it was modified or reversed. The
cases are not discussed here in detail as a number of them are analyzed below. Re-
fusal to work overtime: Pratt & Whitney, Inc., 53 Lab. Arb. 200 (1969); Merchants
Frozen Foods Div., 34 Lab. Arb. 607 (1960); E.B. Wiggins Oil Tool Co., 38 Lab.
Arb. 153 (1961); Wright Mach. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1080 (1962); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 39 Lab. Arb. 299 (1962); American Airlines, Inc., 31 Lab. Arb. 144 (1958);
Todd Shipyards Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 333 (1961). Slowdown: American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 37 Lab. Arb. 401 (1961); Collis Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 1157
(1968); Bourbon Cooperage Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 1149 (1962). Union meetings called
during working hours: Reynolds Metals Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 936 (1969); Kaiser Alumi-
num & Chem. Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. 364 (1958). Absences: Republic Steel Co., 38
Lab. Arb. 329 (1961); Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., 52 Lab. Arb. 221 (1969). Picket
line activity: Philips Indus., Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 943 (1965); Continental Can Co., Inc.,
53 Lab. Arb. 619 (1969). Refusal to cross another union's picket line: Metro East
Journal, 47 Lab. Arb. 610 (1966); Serrick Corp., 32 Lab. Arb. 994 (1959). Instiga-
tion of a wildcat strike: Carrier Corp., 38 Lab. Arb. 1248 (1962). (This case sus-
tains a suspension for one man who tried unsuccessfully to start a walkout. This is an
unusual case, since the discipline of one employee is more likely to be considered in-
subordination or a violation of some other portion of the discipline clause.) Con-
certed calling in late: Reynolds Metals Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 936 (1969). Was it a
strike or a number of quits?: Wellman Bronze & Aluminum Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 212
(1962); Gold Bond Stamp Co., 49 Lab. Arb. 27 (1967).
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and arbitration procedure. Examples of these and other types are shown
in a Bureau of Labor Statistics' study.28
No-strike clauses can vary greatly. Some are very brief, while others de-
fine work stoppages in detail and specify procedures to be followed in the
event of a work stoppage. Some define the responsibilities and liabilities of
the union, and have detailed penalty clauses. Clauses may ban all stop-
pages during the life of the agreement (an absolute ban), or they may per-
mit stoppages under certain conditions. An example of an absolute strike
ban is:
There shall be no strikes, lockouts, or stoppages of work during
the period of the agreement. 29
Questions may arise about the interpretation of brief clauses such as the
one quoted above from Atlantic Gulf Coast Companies, concerning what is
covered by "work stoppage," and what are the responsibilities of individual
union members and the officers under a no-strike clause.
More detail, for example, is given in the following agreement:
Article XXII Provisions Against Work Stoppages
1. It is the understanding of the parties hereto that all grievances
shall be settled promptly in accordance with the Grievance
Procedure and that the parties hereto not resort to strikes,
28. The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Dep't of Labor analyzed 1,717 collec-
tive bargaining agreements (1966) and found restrictions on strikes or lockouts during
the life of the agreement in 1,537 of these. Of these 757 specified an absolute ban; all
but nine provided for arbitration. The other 780 agreements had some limitations
on the strike ban. These limitations took a variety of forms.
In 285 of these contracts there was allowable strike action because a number of
areas were excluded from the arbitration procedure. Among these excluded areas were
the following: establishment of rates of pay for new work, adjustment of incentive
rates, and production standards. In 92 of the 780 contracts the strike ban was in
force only until the grievance procedure was exhausted. These contracts either did
not include arbitration or provided for it only by mutual agreement.
Strike bans were also lifted in "333 contracts if an employer violated the agreement.
Situations permitting the union to strike included an employer's failure to abide by an
arbitrator's award, an employer's failure to make proper wage payments, failure to
make agreed upon contributions to health and welfare funds, violation of union se-
curity provisions, and the committing of unfair labor practices as determined by out-
side parties.
Clauses which permitted termination of the contract in the event of contract viola-
tion were included in 101 contracts with some concentration in transportation and
equipment industries. Substantial or continued violation of the no-strike clause was
frequently specified as the basis for allowable contract cancellation.
For this analysis see U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No.
1425-6, MAJOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 83-94
(1966).
29. Atlantic Gulf Coast Co. & Agents, & Marine Eng'rs (1965) cited in BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, id. at 85. For a discussion of limited strike ban, see note 28
supra, summarizing Bureau of Labor Statistics study.
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slowdowns, or walkouts as a means of settling any griev-
ances, demands, or disputes during the term of this Agreement.
2. No strike, walk-out, picket, boycott, or other individual or
collective action to slow down, interrupt or terminate the work
or employment of any employees, whether conducted by the
International Union, Local Union, or any of their officers or
agents as such, or by any individual employee, and no lock-
out by the Employer shall occur during the term of this Agree-
ment, or any extension thereof.30
The agreement continues with a provision for the union to disavow any
unauthorized strike, and to direct the employees to return to work, and stip-
ulates that discipline for an employee participating in such a work stoppage
will not constitute a grievance unless the union claims the disciplined em-
ployee did not participate in the activity or was disciplined in a discrimina-
tory fashion.
Some clauses direct the union to furnish the employer with a letter or tele-
gram disavowing the work stoppage which can be posted on the bulletin
board within a given time, and add that if the local union fails to do so, the
international should supply such notification. 3'
Some no-strike clauses specify that there shall be no discussion of griev-
ances or referral to arbitration until normal operations are resumed.
3 2
Unions that are particularly concerned about liability for damages in the
event of an unauthorized work stoppage have accepted clauses giving man-
agement very extensive control of the discipline in return for removal of lia-
bility for such damages. One such contract, along with a typical no-strike,
no lock-out clause, and the usual provisions for the local and international
union officers to publicly disavow the strike and get the strikers back to
work, specified:
• . . there shall be no financial liability on the part of the sig-
natory International Union, Local or Officers thereof . . . [pro-
vided designated steps to end the work stoppage are taken.] The
Company may impose at its sole discretion, disciplinary measures
including discharge, in the case of any or all employees who have
30. West Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 51 Lab. Arb. 227, 228 (1968). Accord, Ameri-
can Hoist & Derrick Co., 53 Lab. Arb. 45 (1969) the no-strike clause covers "any
strike, picketing, sit down, stay in, slow down or other curtailment of production or
interference with work in or about the Company's plant or premises." In an Acme
Boot Co. case, 52 Lab. Arb. 1043 (1969), the agreement bans "[unisanctioned strike,
stoppage, slowdown of work, picketing or work interference..."
31. See GAF Corp., 52 Lab. Arb. 480 (1969); Allen Indus., Inc., 52 Lab. Arb.
1131, 1132 (1969) and Dresser Indus., 52 Lab. Arb. 978, 980 (1969).
32. Moraine Mfg. Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 1161, 1162 (1963). The subject of selective
discipline for union officials instigating wildcat strikes is discussed in detail infra;
accordingly, references to clauses on this topic are not included here.
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engaged in . . . . any of the unauthorized acts described above.
Such disciplinary acts shall be final and binding upon the Union
and the employees covered hereby.
33
In contrast to this, in Dresser Industries, Inc., the parties agreed to coop-
erate in disciplining "up to and including discharge any employee or em-
ployees who [interfered with the operation of the company in violation of
the agreement]; however, this will not be construed to limit the Company's
right to seek legal remedies through court action."
'34
In another instance the union was freed from financial obligations for un-
authorized acts of its members or agents, which the union could not control,
while retaining the right to have discipline for such acts subject to grievance
and arbitration procedure. 35
3. Discipline Clause
As is evident from the preceding section, the discipline for a wildcat strike
may be included in the no-strike clause. Alternatively, it may be a special
section in the discipline clause.
The other portions of the general discipline clause are important in es-
tablishing the rights of a grievant and in indicating the powers of the arbi-
trator in the event that the protest of discipline for a wildcat strike comes to
an arbitrator.
An example of a discipline clause which gives the arbitrator considerable
latitude is quoted below:
Discipline
A. The Employer retains the right to discharge or discipline
any employee for just cause. Discharge and disciplinary action
shall constitute cases which come under the method of adjusting
grievances herein above provided and shall be subject to arbitra-
tion if not amicably settled....
C. In justifiable cases, the arbitrator shall have the power to
reinstate a discharged employee to his former position, with un-
broken seniority and back pay, either partial or entire, to the ex-
tent to which the circumstances indicate.36
3. Arbitration Clause
From the foregoing it is apparent that the no-strike discipline, and grievance-
33. MacMillan Bloedel Prod., Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 667 (1970).
34. Moraine Mfg. Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 1161, 1162 (1963).
35. 52 Lab. Arb. 978, 980 (1969).
36. Kentile, Inc., 40 Lab. Arb. 616, 617 (1963).
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arbitration clauses are all interrelated. They delineate the areas within which
an arbitrator works if an unsettled case comes to him for determination.
In many cases any unresolved grievance can be taken at the request of
either party to arbitration. An example of a wide grievance and arbitration
clause is: "During the term of this agreement, all disputes, grievances, com-
plaints and adjustments * * * shall be settled in accordance with the griev-
ance and arbitration procedure. '37
There are other contracts in which the no-strike clause is limited to the
time during which the grievance procedure is operating; thereafter a strike is
permissible on an issue still unsettled at the conclusion of the grievance pro-
cedure, unless the parties mutually agree to arbitration of that particular
case.38
Arbitration clauses customarily state that the arbitrator has "no authority
to add to, subtract from, alter or modify the terms of this agreement.139
Frequently the question put before the arbitrator in a disciplinary case is
phrased as follows: "Did the company have good cause for disciplining the
employee, and if not, to what remedy is he entitled?"
In some agreements the arbitrator is restricted closely in his assessment of
guilt or determination of the penalty. For example, in a Warren Co. case,40
the arbitration clause stated in part:
It is the intention of the parties that the arbitrator's authority is
narrow and "no common law of the plant" nor any "common law
of industry and labor relations" be the basis of any decision * * *
Because of this contractual restriction the arbitrator did not consider por-
tions of the company's post hearing brief.
Sometimes the company retains sole discretion for the discipline of an em-
ployee who violates the no-strike clause. 41 In such cases the arbitrator has
only the power to determine if the employee engaged in a wildcat strike.
The arbitrator cannot alter the discipline.42 Only if he found that the em-
ployee had not violated the no-strike provision of the contract could he elim-
inate the penalty.
Occasionally some contracts will specify the terms for an award of pay-
ment of back pay in the event of reinstatement, saying that it
. . . shall be limited to the amount of straight-time pay which
37. E. B. Wiggins Oil Tool Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 153, 154 (1953).
38. General Elec. Co., 31 Lab. Arb. 28, 29 (1958).
39. See, e.g., Philips Indus., Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 943, 946-47 (1965).
40. 39 Lab. Arb. 395, 397 (1962).
41. Quick Service Laundry & Cleaners, 52 Lab. Arb. 121 (1968); and MacMillan
Bloedel Prod., Inc., 55 Lab. Arb. 667 (1970).
42. Brunswick Corp., 37 Lab. Arb. 951 (1961).
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he otherwise would have earned from his employment with the
Company, less any earnings, compensation, or other benefits by
the employee, which he was not required to return. .... 43
Cases in Which Arbitrators Upheld
Company Discipline
Detailed company testimony concerning their frequent observance of strik-
ing workers on the picket line was sufficient in a Continental Can Co. case
44
to persuade the arbitrator to uphold the discharge of eight workers. Two
other workers whose presence on the picket line was brief, who attended no
planning sessions for the strike, and who expressed regret to the company for
their participation were reinstated without back pay.
The discharge of a union steward was upheld by the arbitrator in a Well-
man Bronze and Aluminum Co. case 45 because he walked out and became
the spokesmen for a group who went out on a wildcat strike. The triggering
incident was a dispute over the propriety of a discharge of a worker for
leaving his work place 45 minutes early. The same arbitrator heard both
cases and reinstated the man who walked off the job early after a 30 day
suspension. It is not unusual to have the penalty on the triggering case mod-
ified or reversed but to have the penalty for the wildcat strike upheld.
In a dispute over a changed incentive rate, the president of a union made
threats on three occasions that a walkout would occur unless the old rate
were restored. Later he called a meeting of union officers, and still later
blew a whistle which was a signal for the walkout to begin. The arbitrator
upheld his discharge because he was clearly the instigator of the walkout.
The arbitrator reinstated two other discharged union officers on the grounds
that they had not been instigators of the walkout and that their degree of
guilt was substantially different from that of the president.
46
While the evidence was somewhat in conflict (as is usual in such cases)
the arbitrator in a case involving Pneumatic Products Co.47 found that a
union grievance committee chairman had been an instigator of an unau-
thorized walkout. His discharge was sustained. One important piece of
evidence, in the arbitrator's view was the fact that the chairman did nothing
to stop the walkout and immediately hired a hall in which to hold a union
meeting.
Misrepresentation of facts by a leader of the union has been a factor in
43. Masonite Corp., 54 Lab. Arb. 633, 637-38 (1970).
44. 53 Lab. Arb. 619 (1969).
45. 39 Lab. Arb. 212 (1962).
46. McGraw-Edison Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 76 (1962).
47. 38 Lab. Arb. 986 (1962).
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determining responsibility for an unauthorized walkout. In E. B. Wiggins
Oil Tool Co., Inc.,4 8 the arbitrator found among other things that the chair-
man of the shop committee had advised union members that the union had
ordered them to refuse to work overtime. The reason given was that the
grievance procedure had broken down. The arbitrator found that there was
no evidence that the grievance procedure had broken down and sustained
the discharge of the chairman.
In a case given to the authors on condition that it not be identified, leader-
ship of a wildcat strike was established to the satisfaction of the arbitrator by
the fact that two union officers were the first to punch out the time clock
when the walkout began. The discharge of the two officers was sustained.
In other cases photographs taken of picket lines and notes taken at the
time by supervisors concerning picket line activity have been used by com-
panies to establish leadership activity in wildcat strikes. 49
Cases in Which the Discipline Was Held to be too Severe
and the Penalty Was Modified by the Arbitrator
When arbitrators find that the evidence is inconclusive that the worker com-
mitted the act for which he is disciplined, the penalty is often modified or re-
scinded.
In a case involving Bourbon Cooperage Co.,50 a newly elected shop stew-
ard was discharged for allegedly encouraging a slowdown. The arbitrator
indicated there was considerable doubt in his mind as to whether the steward
actually advised employees to slowdown or whether he advised them to work
more carefully to avoid discipline for poor production. The arbitrator or-
dered the steward reinstated with back pay but with a warning against any
attempt to interfere with production.
In an Ohio Brass Co. case, 5 ' a union president was discharged after a
wildcat strike started. The arbitrator found that the president had made a
good faith effort to end the stoppage. He had called a union meeting to
urge return to work, but the crowd would not listen and the meeting broke
up in disorder. The arbitrator ordered reinstatement. The union president
had lost no pay since the union had made up his lost wages during the pe-
riod of his discharge.
48. 38 Lab. Arb. 153 (1961).
49. See generally Edward & Bergmann, The Legal and Practical Remedies Avail-
able to Employers to Enforce a Contractual "No-Strike" Commitment, 21 LAB. L.J.
3-21 (1970).
50. 38 Lab. Arb. 1149 (1962).
51. 31 Lab. Arb. 392 (1958).
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In a rather unusual award involving the Butler Manufacturing Co.,52
the arbitrator reinstated an employee who had been discharged for leading
a wildcat strike. There had been a series of such walkouts, earlier. The
employee was ordered reinstated after a six month disciplinary layoff dur-
ing which he would receive no pay and accumulate no seniority. The in-
dividual was also ordered to cease and desist from engaging in any future
work stoppages in violation of the agreement. The arbitrator thought that
his award would be more effective in ending wildcat strikes than upholding
the discharge would. The worker's presence in the plant after the end of his
suspension "will be a symbol in the plant that wildcat strikes and violations
of the contract do not pay and that employees are punished therefore. '58
Complete Reversal of the Discipline by the Arbitrator
As discussed above, arbitrators may revoke entirely the discipline imposed
when they find that a worker whom the employer has disciplined as an in-
stigator of the strike was not, in fact, a leader in the walkout.
In a case involving National Lead Co. of Ohio,5 4 the late Carl R. Schedler
reversed a somewhat novel penalty that a Company had invoked for a wild-
cat strike. The unauthorized stoppage began on May 28, 1959 and con-
tinued over the Memorial holiday. The union did not grieve the three day
suspension which the company imposed on participants but did bring to ar-
bitration the propriety of the company action in denying holiday pay for
Memorial Day to which the workers were otherwise entitled. Arbitrator
Schedler ruled that it was not proper for the company to withhold this holi-
day pay. He reasoned:
It seems to me that to deny these employees, as a disciplinary
measure, holiday pay which they have qualified for under the
terms of the contract is in the nature of a fine and not in the nature
of a disciplinary penalty. To fine a person is to impose a pe-
cuniary punishment. I do not believe that either the labor con-
tract or the working rules contemplate or permit the fining of
an employee as a disciplinary measure for misconduct. 5
To complete the record on this point it should be noted that in a virtually
identical case another arbitrator, the late Milton H. Schmidt, ruled in an ex-
actly opposite fashion. In a case involving Continental Can Co., Inc.5 6 a
wildcat strike was in progress over the July 4th holiday. Again the holiday
pay was withheld as a penalty for the strike. The agreement specified that
52. 55 Lab. Arb. 451 (1970) and 55 Lab. Arb. 1214 (1970).
53. 55 Lab. Arb. 451 (1970).
54. 32 Lab. Arb. 865 (1959).
55. Id. at 868.
56. 31 Lab. Arb. 558 (1958).
19731
Catholic University Law Review
an employee engaging in a wildcat strike "may be discharged or disciplined."
In his award the arbitrator ruled:
The word "discipline . . . is not defined or particularized.
• . . The withholding of holiday benefits from workers on strike
when the holiday occurs is, in my judgment, a type of penalty
which comes within the definition of discipline. 57
In a case involving Westinghouse Electric Corp.,58 a group of first-shift
employees were asked if they would work overtime and a number of them
refused. The company then instructed a group of second shift employees to
work overtime and all refused. All of the employees on both shifts who re-
fused were given a one day disciplinary lay-off. The arbitrator ruled that
amounts of overtime, concerted refusal by employees when instructed to
work constituted a wildcat strike. He sustained the penalty for the second-
shift workers who had been ordered to work overtime but revoked the pen-
alty for the first shift workers on the ground that they (unlike the second
shift men) had simply been asked, not directed, to work the overtime. In
the past it had been customary to permit workers to decline overtime without
explanation or penalty.
The Leadership Issue
In the vast majority of cases studied, disciplinary action by employers was
either (1) taken only against the leaders of the wildcat strike or (2) more
serious disciplinary action was taken against the leaders and relatively minor
discipline was meted out to the workers who walked out as "followers." 59
The leaders in some cases were stewards or union officers; in other cases the
leaders were rank and file workers who in effect became leaders at the start
of the strike. In some cases the latter were employees whose grievances
were the cause that led to the walkouts.
In many awards arbitrators write extensively and eloquently concerning
the duty of the officer or the steward to prevent or to stop the unauthorized
stoppage. Typical is the following written by Arbitrator Eric Schmertz in a
United Parcel Service Co. case:
If there is one principle that is universally recognized in the
field of industrial relations, it is that shop stewards have the high-
est duty to faithfully adhere to all the provisions of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and to actively instruct each employee to
57. Id. at 560.
58. 39 Lab. Arb. 299 (1962).
59. Onl) infrequently is there severe discipline for a large group of employees as




do so. * * * It is the obligation of the steward to set an ex-
ample for all Union members within his jurisdiction by demon-
strating his loyalty to the terms and conditions of the contract ne-
gotiated by his Union with the Employer. Hence it is inconsistent
in the extreme, for a shop steward to lead, or support, or partici-
pate in a work stoppage in violation of a "no-strike" clause ...
Indeed, a shop steward's duty in the face of an unauthorized
work stoppage is well settled. Not only should he make a deter-
mined effort to prevent the stoppage before it begins, but upon
its development must actively and unequivocally attempt to bring
an end of the stoppage at the earliest possible moment. More-
over, he must set an example by either reporting to work himself
or by clearly indicating a willingness to work if his Employer
wishes him to do so. 0°
In that case the arbitrator upheld the discharge of eight stewards, finding
there was just cause for their dismissals.
If a union membership votes to call or to continue a wildcat strike, does
this change the responsibilities falling upon the stewards or officers as in-
dicated in the preceding quotation? The answer is clearly negative. In a
case involving Homer Laughlin China Co."' the arbitrator upheld the dis-
charge of five union officers. He found that the company had adequate
grounds for considering these five to be the principal leaders of , the walkout
and he further held:
It is no defense to the leaders of an "illegal" strike to say that
they were merely acting at the request of the membership of the
union as expressed in an affirmative vote of the body. The af-
firmative vote of the body cannot make legal that which is illegal.
Nor can such vote infuse legality into the action of the strike
leadership undertaken in reliance upon such vote.
62
It is often argued in defense of disciplined union officers that their failure
to return to work during a wildcat strike or their failure to induce others to
return to work was due to their inability to get through a picket line or to
their fear of personal violence and harm if they elected to go through a picket
line. In such a case the arbitrator's ruling will turn, in large part of course,
on his finding of fact. In some cases the arbitrator is persuaded that there
was actually no fear of violence, that the argument is a sham, and then the
argument is disregarded.
In a Serrick Corp. case, 63 the arbitrator found that the discharged union
officers made a good faith effort to enter the plant on the first day of the
60. 47 Lab. Arb. 1100, 1101 (1966).
61. 41 Lab. Arb. 1216 (1963).
62. Id. at 1219.
63. 32 Lab. Arb. 994 (1959).
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strike but were barred by mass picketing and some violence. He found that
on subsequent days the officers made only token efforts to enter the plant
when police officers were present to assure access. In this case discharge
was changed to reinstatement without back pay.
A Minority View Concerning the
Responsibility of Union Leaders
One of the nation's well known arbitrators, the late Whitley P. McCoy, for a
time held a theory concerning the responsibilities of union leaders in con-
nection with wildcat strikes which differed substantially from the commonly
accepted view. As indicated above it is frequently held that leaders have a
positive responsibility to prevent or end a stoppage and that if they fail in
this responsibility they are liable for disciplinary action by the employer.
In a case involving Pittsburgh Standard Conduit Co.,6 4 he found as a fact
that two discharged union committeemen had neither incited nor led the
wildcat strike which preceded their discharges. He also found that they
made at best only very half-hearted attempts to prevent the walkout. The
Company contended that the two committeemen because of their position
had a special duty to prevent the walkout and, when they failed in this duty,
the discharges were justified.
It is in disagreeing with the Company on this point that Arbitrator McCoy
parted company with most arbitrators. In his award he wrote:
Conceding, for the purpose of argument, that they failed in their
duty, it must be asked "duty to whom?" Undoubtedly to the
employees who elected them, to the local Union of which they
were officers or agents, and to the International Union which they
served. Their breach of duty might have rendered their principals
liable to damages. But I cannot agree that election or appoint-
ment to Union office creates any privity between the Union's
agent and the Company so as to give rise to duties to the latter.
The principal, the Union, undoubtedly owes duties to the Com-
pany, created by the collective bargaining Agreement, and the
inaction of its agents may constitute a breach of such duties on the
part of the Union. But the inaction of the agents, the breach of
duties owed to the principal, creates no cause of action in a third
party against the other party's agent. These are elementary
principles in the law of agency and of legal liability. 65
In short in this case it was Arbitrator McCoy's view that discharge of
union leaders for inaction in stopping a wildcat strike was improper. He
64. 33 Lab. Arb. 807 (1959).
65. Id. at 808.
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reinstated the grievants without loss of seniority rights, but without back pay,
because of picket line activity after their discharge.
In another somewhat unusual point of view, related to the principle ad-
vanced by Arbitrator McCoy, Arbitrator Herman Gray held that union of-
ficers, acting as such, should not be penalized for advising employees to re-
fuse overtime work.0 6 Two union officers posted on the bulletin board a
notice over their signatures as union officers, in which they stated that the
president of the local requested all members not to perform any overtime.
Warning notices were given by the company to the two union officers. Ar-
bitrator Gray vacated the warnings, stating that regardless of the propriety
of the union-requested ban on overtime the two men were simply function-
ing as union officers and could not be penalized for this. He stated:
An employee of the Company who at the same time is a Union
officer serves in two capacities. Each carries with it its own duties
and responsibilities, but they are separate and distinct. The fact
that he is a Union officer does not excuse him from the faithful
performance of the obligations he owes the Company as its em-
ployee and if he fails in that respect he is subject to discipline as
every other employee is. On the other hand, if he misconducts
himself only as a Union officer, it would be decidedly unfair to
punish him in his status of employee. Furthermore, it would im-
peril the administration of Union affairs if its officers were sub-
ject to such liability.
67
He added that if the company believed the notice injurious to its rights, it
should have recourse to the grievance procedure against the union.
In view of the very considerable body of cases in which arbitrators have
upheld discipline against union officers for encouraging refusal to work ov-
ertime Arbitrator Gray's view must be considered a minority position.
In a case already cited,68 the union argued the point of view advanced by
Arbitrators McCoy and Gray in an effort to secure reversal of the discharge
of the union president. In this case, Arbitrator Robert G. Howlett cited in a
footnote cases by a number of leading arbitrators who had held that union
leaders have a duty to act affirmatively to prevent or end an unauthorized
stoppage and sustained the discharge.6 9
Union Claims of Discrimination
In arbitration cases dealing with discipline imposed for unauthorized work
stoppages the union has often raised a claim of discrimination. It is pointed
66. American Airlines, Inc., 31 Lab. Arb. 144 (1958).
67. Id.
68. McGraw-Edison Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 76 (1962).
69. Id. at 77, n.3.
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out that some persons have been disciplined and that others have not. It is
contended, therefore, that those who have been penalized are the victims of
discrimination.
What appears to be the prevailing view concerning this point has been
summed up by Arbitrator Harry Platt in a Ford Motor Co. case.70 He up-
held the discharge of a local union president and eleven rank and file work-
ers on the grounds that these twelve had been the leaders of the strike.
Concerning the union's contention of discrimination, he wrote:
Inequality of treatment in disciplinary matters does not amount
to unjust discrimination if there are rational grounds for distin-
guishing between those to be disciplined and those not to be dis-
ciplined. It is only where the grounds for distinction are irra-
tional, arbitrary or whimsical that disciplining of some employees
and not others may be looked upon as unjust and discriminatory.
In these cases there is no proof that any other employees were
guilty to the same extent and of the same misconduct as the ag-
grieved.
71
In Todd Shipyards Corp.,72 the union contention of unfair discrimination
was upheld by the arbitrator. A union steward with 21 years service was
discharged for leading a refusal to work overtime. The others involved in
the work stoppage were given only disciplinary warnings. The disparity of
treatment was held by the arbitrator to be so great as to constitute discrimi-
nation. The steward was reinstated without back pay.
Similarly, in Moraine Manufacturing Co.,73 the arbitrator found that the
employer did not have just cause to discharge a union committee chairman
for leadership in a wildcat strike. He was ordered reinstated without back
pay. The arbitrator found that he was young and inexperienced in union
office and that another committeeman with more union officer experience
had provided at least as much leadership in the walkout. The arbitrator
found that the difference between the two week suspension given the other
committeeman and the discharge of the chairman was too disproportionate
under the circumstances to be consistent with the contract's requirement of
just cause.
Justifiable differentiation in the severity of the disciplinary action taken
against different employees has been approved in many cases.
In Mack Truck, Inc.,74 where the contract required "uniformity in penal-
ties assessed for the same class of acts," the arbitrator approved more severe
70. 41 Lab. Arb. 609 (1963).
71. Id. at 616.
72. 36 Lab. Arb. 333 (1961).
73. 40 Lab. Arb. 1161 (1963).
74. 41 Lab. Arb. 1240 (1964).
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discipline for those who had participated in an earlier wildcat strike. In the
same case he also approved more severe penalties for those who engaged in
more than one overt act in connection with an illegal work stoppage as com-
pared with those who had committed only one.
Procedural Issues Involved in Wildcat Strike Disciplinary Action
The reported arbitration cases dealing with discipline for wildcat strikes bring
to light a variety of procedural issues.
How quickly must wildcat strikers return to work if they are to avoid dis-
ciplinary action? In American Air Filter Co.,75 the contract provided that
employees engaging in any work stoppage must be given a "reasonable time"
to resume work. The arbitrator held that the company had complied with
this provision when the first act of discharge (removal of the time cards from
the rack) occurred one hour after the chief steward had at the beginning of
the walk out ordered the men back to work.
How does "forgive and forget" agreement operate? In a Borden Ice
Cream Co. case, 76 a wildcat strike in the hardening room caused the ice
cream to pile up over the floor and continuation of the stoppage could have
involved a much larger loss of product. In a hastily called meeting of com-
pany and union representatives with a federal mediator and a state mediator
an agreement was reached covering various points in controversy which had
led up to the walkout. It was agreed that all persons would immediately go
back to work. Nothing was said in this agreement about any penalty
against any individuals. Shortly thereafter the Company discharged an em-
ployee involved in the walkout. The arbitrator ordered his reinstatement
with full back pay on the grounds that the agreement made to get the work-
ers back precluded any disciplinary action.
In another case involving a "forgive and forget" agreement the company
was able to show to the satisfaction of the arbitrator that the agreement did
not include one worker who was subsequently disciplined. The arbitrator
reinstated the worker, but without eight weeks' back pay.77
Can a company take summary action to dismiss a worker or must the
company file a grievance? A novel defense of a disciplined worker was
raised by the union in a case involving Union Tank Car Co.78 A worker
was given a suspension for leading an improper work stoppage. In addition
to denying that he was the leader, the union also maintained that the com-
75. 47 Lab. Arb. 129 (1966).
76. 45 Lab. Arb. 1034 (1966).
77. Southwest Steel Prod., 31 Lab. Arb. 552 (1958).
78. 38 Lab. Arb. 1144 (1962).
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pany should have filed a grievance rather than disciplining the worker at
once. The arbitrator rejected this argument, pointing out that under the
management clause of the agreement the company had the right to disci-
pline workers.
Does the failure of some grievants to testify in their own behalf in an ar-
bitration hearing mean that they must lose their case? In a case involving
Ingersoll-Rand Co.,79 the company argued that since some of the workers
who were given time off for participating in a wildcat strike did not appear
and testify at the hearing, they had forfeited any rights to redress that they
may have had. The arbitrator, however, ruled against this contention hold-
ing that "silence cannot be considered as a basis for any reliable implication
of involvement."
Can a company suspend a large number of workers a few at a time to
avoid seriously hampering its production? It appears to be not uncommon
in some industries for short suspensions given a large number of workers to
be staggered over a period of time to avoid serious disruptions to production.
An arbitrator sustained such action in United States Steel Corp.,80 ruling
that if the employer were required to penalize all employees at once, it
would create the same sort of situation as that for which it sought to penalize.
Within what sort of time limits must discipline be imposed? It is generally
accepted as a principle of industrial discipline that it must be imposed
promptly, not long after the event leading to the disciplinary action."s With-
in what time limits must the company act? In M. S. L. Industries, Inc.,82 it
was ruled that the time limit should be determined by the time required to
investigate and evaluate the strike and to restore orderly production. Pen-
alties imposed three weeks after the strike ended were held to be within rea-
sonable time limits.
If the agreement calls for written notice to a worker of reasons for disci-
plinary action being taken, is the worker denied due process if the notice of
reasons is given orally? In Mead Corp.,83 the arbitrator held that the oral
notification was sufficient since under it the worker was advised of the rea-
sons for the discipline, and the failure to give written notice was a procedural
oversight in the rush of attempting to get the work stoppage settled.
Can an employer unilaterally change a rule providing for progressive dis-
cipline in case of wildcat strikes? In Armstrong Rubber Co.,s 4 the employer
79. 51 Lab. Arb. 83 (1968).
80. 40 Lab. Arb. 598 (1963).
81. M.S.L. Indus., Inc., 53 Lab. Arb. 75 (1969).
82. Id.
83. 53 Lab. Arb. 342 (1969).
84. 52 Lab. Arb. 501 (1969).
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had proposed to the union and the union had accepted a rule that for the
first wildcat strike in which an employee participated he would be given a
written warning. For the second offense there was to be three days off.
The penalty was to be discharged for participation in a third walkout.
Subsequently, the company without consultation with the union an-
nounced that the rule had been changed to provide a three days' suspension
for the first offense. Some time thereafter a wildcat strike occurred and the
company gave workers a three days' suspension for a first offense. The ar-
bitrator ruled that the Company had not lost its right unilaterally to establish
rules by mutually agreeing with the union on the first set of rules. He re-
versed the penalty against the employees, however, on the grounds that the
jointly-agreed upon rules were still in effect. He indicated that in the
course of the arbitration hearing the union had become fully informed con-
cerning the new, unilaterally established rules and that henceforth such rules
would be in effect.
The Role of Warnings in Connection with Wildcat Strikes
The "common law" of discipline in industrial relations says that for minor
offenses-such as absenteeism-warnings are needed before more serious
types of discipline are imposed.85 Wildcat strikes, however, are typically
regarded as major offenses permitting discipline for the first offense. As
discussed above, no-strike clauses frequently give management the right to
administer discipline, including discharge, for work stoppages by employees.
Mention of warnings or progressive discipline in no-strike clauses is extreme-
ly rare.86 Employers who have meted out discipline without previous warn-
ings under strong no-strike clauses have usually had the discipline sustained,
if it was considered just on other grounds.
In Westinghouse Electric Corp.,s7 the arbitrator did not accept the union
argument that disciplinary layoff could come only on the third offense, since
the discipline clause provided for progressive discipline. He held that the
discipline clause referred to individual employees, while refusal of the sec-
ond and third shifts to work scheduled overtime was a concerted work stop-
page under the no-strike clause. The company could not be expected to
stand by impotently during two successive work stoppages, before imposing
discipline for a third. He sustained 2-day suspensions for 92 second and
third shift workers.
85. Id.
86. The Armstrong Rubber Co. case discussed above (52 Lab. Arb. 501), which had
originally provided for a system of warnings, prior to suspension, was very unusual.
87. 39 Lab. Arb. 299 (1962).
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Frequently, however, managements, operating under strong no-strike
clauses, may choose not to impose penalties for brief work stoppages. As
developed in more detail below, they choose more informal methods of get-
ting workers back on the job. If, however, after tolerating a series of wildcat
strikes with no official comment or with a mild general warning they sudden-
ly impose discipline, unions often argue that they should have been warned
of impending change in discipline policy. In American Host & Derrick
Co.,88 the union charged the company with entrapping the employees into
thinking they could engage in a wildcat strike over grievances and receive no
more than a reprimand citing a past policy of no suspensions or discharges
in previous wildcat strikes. The arbitrator referred to the clear language of
the no-strike agreement and sustained four out of five of the discharges and
22 one-week suspensions.
In at least one case, however, an arbitrator was influenced by a past leni-
ent policy. A laborer was discharged for leading a wildcat stoppage. The
arbitrator reinstated him without back pay because he found that the com-
pany had for a long time given only a few days suspension for leadership in
work stoppages, and workers had the right to expect that this pattern would
continue. 89
If on the other hand the company does choose to tighten discipline for
work stoppages and gives a warning that discharge would result from any
repetition of a wildcat strike, this may have a bearing on the arbitrator's de-
cision in a subsequent stoppage. In Insulrock Co. case,90 the discharge of
24 workers who walked out and set up a picket line was sustained in part be-
cause they had been warned that discharge would follow any repetition of
an earlier walkout.91
Warnings also play a part in dealing with wildcat strikes in other ways.
Employers sometimes issue them to "followers" as opposed to "leaders." In
Ingersoll-Rand Co.,92 a number of employees were discharged, others given
disciplinary suspensions, and 191 employees were given letters of warning
for leaving the plant prior to the end of the shift and not returning. These
letters of reprimand were sustained by the arbitrator.
Promises of removal of warnings can also have a deterrent effect. In one
case a company had discharged the instigator of a wildcat strike and issued
written reprimands to 5 "followers." The case of the discharged worker was
taken to arbitration. Even before this case was heard the company agreed to
88. 53 Lab. Arb. 45 (1969).
89. Granite City Steel Co., 53 Lab. Arb. 909 (1969).
90. 39 Lab. Arb. 169 (1962).
91. For a somewhat similar case see Okonite Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 977 (1961).
92. 50 Lab. Arb. 487 (1968).
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expunge the warnings from the records of the five workers if at the end of the
year they had not become involved in any more unauthorized work stop-
pages.9
3
Wildcat Strikes for Which No Discipline is Imposed
Lest the reader be misled by the foregoing extensive discussion of discipline
imposed by employers following wildcat strikes, an important point should be
emphasized. There are many wildcat strikes which lead to no imposition of
discipline. This is clear from interviews the authors held in the course of this
study with company officials, union officials, and others. There is no way to
quantify this or to determine in what percentage of the cases some discipline
is handed down and in what percentage none is meted out. It is clear, how-
ever, that there are many cases in which no discipline results.
In some cases union officers will make an agreement with an employer
that if the company will promise not to mete out any discipline, the officials
will be able to get the workers back to work at once. In other cases, often
when the work stoppage involves only a few workers (who perhaps have sim-
ply sat down in their department and refused to work for a few hours until
some remedial action which they seek has been brought about), the employ-
er feels that the matter is not serious enough to involve disciplinary action.
Occasionally the company may recognize that the grievance concerning
which the job action arose has merit, and that while the workers have elected
the wrong method of getting action on their grievance, the company has con-
tributed to the problem that gave rise to the grievance. The company may
decide therefore, that no discipline will be taken against anyone as a result
of the work stoppage.
Cases in Which Arbitrators Were Asked to Award
Monetary Damages for Wildcat Strikes
As indicated at length above, the most common action taken by employers
against leaders or participants in wildcat strikes, is some form of personal dis-
cipline. In a smaller but considerable number of cases, however, the employ-
er has chosen another course of action. He has filed a grievance against the
union because of the wildcat strike and has asked the arbitrator for monetary
damages. 4 (In some cases employers have both imposed discipline on in-
stigators of a wildcat strike and have asked an arbitrator for an award of
damages.)
93. Rexall Chemical Co., 38 Lab. Arb. 705 (1962).
94. The employer has the possible alternative of filing in the courts for damages
under Section 301(a) LMRA. The right of employers to collect damages for a breach
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Does an arbitrator have power, however, to award monetary damages in a
wildcat strike case in the absence of a specific clause in the contract giving
him this power? In a number of such cases, arbitrators have held that they
do have this power. In Publishers' Association of New York City (New
York Times),95 Arbitrator Peter Seitz found that nothing in the contract pre-
vented him from granting compensatory damages when it was determined
that the agreement had been violated by a wildcat strike. He awarded com-
pensatory damages of $1,838.90. The demand of the publisher for punitive
damages was denied.
Similarly, in PPG Industries, Inc.,90 Arbitrator James C. Vadakin held that
he had the power to award damages. He stated:
Unless the machinery for enforcement of the contract includes
damages or other affirmative remedies for the benefit of an in-
jured party,. . . the contract becomes a nullity.9T
He assessed compensatory damages of $448.59 against the Glaziers and
Glass Workers Local Union No. 1928 for a wildcat strike. Both this case
and the preceding one cite parallel cases where the arbitrators ruled that they
had the power to assess damages, even though there was no specific damage
provision in the agreement.
of the contract by the union is established by a number of cases such as Teamsters Local
74 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962), and Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Mine
Workers, 76 L.R.R.M. 2003 (6th Cir. 1970) (judgment for almost $250,000).
The possibility for a suit in the courts by an employer for Section 301(a) damages,
occurring as a result of a work stoppage, depends on the terms of the no-strike clause
and the breadth of the grievance-arbitration clauses. See Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery
Workers Local 50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962). If both sides can file grievances, and a wild-
cat strike is not exempted, the parties must first exhaust the arbitration procedure. If
only the union or an employee can bring a grievance, the company can sue directly.
Burden of proof of the violation of the no strike clause and of the extent of the
damages is upon the company.
See Edwards & Bergman, The Legal and Practical Remedies Available to Employers
to Enforce a "No-Strike" Commitment, 21 LAB. L.J., 1, at 3-21 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Edwards & Bergman], and Unkovic, Enforcing the No-Strike Clause, 21 LAB.
L.J. at 367-96 (1970). Unkovic expresses the view that arbitration might give more
prompt action, and points out that the award is final and binding, but notes that court
and arbitration procedures differ. An arbitrator may find a violation exists, but not
award damages. (This is illustrated by a number of cases cited below, in which par-
tial damages, or no damages at all have been awarded.) Unkovic also thinks that
courts may award more substantial damages, although some arbitrators have awarded
sizeable amounts.
95. 37 Lab. Arb. 509 (1961). In Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 42 Lab. Arb.
95 (1964), Arbitrator Monroe Berkowitz awarded $5000 in damages for a wildcat
strike, including the amount of a suspended fine imposed against the union as the re-
sult of a prior work stoppage, to become payable upon repetition of the incident. The
amount awarded was less than the direct damages suffered by the publisher, in view of
the efforts of the union officials to persuade the employees to return to work.
96. 51 Lab. Arb. 500 (1968).
97. Id. at 503.
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Not all aribtrators, however, have so construed their powers. In Waycross
Sportswear, Inc.,9s a group of workers were discharged for participating in a
wildcat strike. The strike was triggered by the employer's change of a prac-
tice concerning the frequency of plant visits by a union representative. The
union sought damages for the company's alleged violation of the agreement
as well as reinstatement of discharged workers. The arbitrator denied the
damages sought by the union on the grounds that the arbitrator has no juris-
diction to decide any matters other than those involving an interpretation or
application of the agreement.99
98. 53 Lab. Arb. 1061 (1969).
99. Illustrative of cases in which arbitrators have awarded damages in cases
growing out of wildcat strikes are the following:
(1) In Master Builders' Ass'n of Western Pennsylvania, Inc., 48 Lab. Arb. 865
(1967) there was a three day strike over a union claim that a union worker should
man an automatic elevator. The arbitrator found that it was a wildcat strike and
awarded damages of $562.70 to the company.
(2) In another case involving Master Builders' Ass'n of Western Pennsylvania,
Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. 1018 (1968), damages were awarded in the amount of $2,772
against the Carpenters' District Council of Western Pennsylvania.
(3) In Forest City Publishing Co., 50 Lab. Arb. 683 (1968), there had been
earlier wildcat strikes and the company had warned that they would seek damages if
the unauthorized stoppages continued. A chapel meeting, which, by contract, was to
last only 30 minutes, was continued for six and a half hours. The president of the
local union made no effort to adjourn the meeting. In the light of these facts, dam-
ages of $7,956.80 were awarded to the company, to be paid by Local 53 of the Inter-
national Typographical Union.
(4) A rather novel situation is presented in American Pipe and Construction Co.,
43 Lab. Arb. 1126 (1964). Because the Boilermaker-Blacksmith Lodge No. 10 was
found by the arbitrator to have engaged in a wildcat strike, the employer was awarded
$1,035.46 damages. In another grievance before the arbitrator at the same time, it was
ruled that the company had violated the agreement by not having a sufficiently large
crew on the job for safe handling of some rigging work, and for this the union was
awarded damages of $299.83. This latter sum was offset against the larger sum which
the union was required to pay to the company.
(5) It was ruled in S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 74 (1969) that one
day was a reasonable time in which the union should bring a wildcat strike to an end.
Since the arbitrator found that the union had failed to end the strike in this period of
time, and since the strike continued for three additional days, damages of $16,828.98
were awarded to the company.
(6) A union steward who called a wildcat strike was held, in Foster Grading Co.,
52 Lab. Arb. 197 (1968), to be a responsible agent of the union and therefore the
union was liable for damages growing out of the walkout at a construction site. The
arbitrator awarded the company $3,010.00.
(7) In Vulcan Mold & Iron Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 396 (1969), the arbitrator ruled
(as in the cases cited in the first part of this section) that the award of damages was
proper even though the contract does not specifically provide for it, since the arbitrator
has the power to provide an appropriate remedy in the absence of contract language
barring such an award. The United Auto Workers International Union was found not
to be liable for damages but the local union was ordered to pay damages of $20,334 to
the company for a wildcat strike.
(8) In Mercer, Fraser Co., 54 Lab. Arb. 1125 (1970), the arbitrator found that,
because of a wildcat strike, the Company was entitled to damages for out-of-pocket
expenses and lost profit on the ready-mix concrete it was obligated to buy from other
sources to supply its customers, and to a reasonable portion of its claim for overhead
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There have been a number of cases where requested damages have been
denied. In contrast to the New York Times case, Merchants Frozen Foods
Divisions'"° requested damages from a wildcat strike were denied to the em-
ployer by the arbitrator. He found that damages should not be paid because
there was no evidence that the union, through its designated officers, was in
any manner involved in instigating, encouraging or approving the contract
violation.
Similarly, in Booth Newspapers, Inc.,101 an employer's request for dam-
ages was denied because the arbitrator found that there was no evidence that
the union officials encouraged, directed, or prolonged the unauthorized stop-
page.
In contrast to the Foster Grading Co. case, in which the acts of a shop
steward were held to bind the union, in Wallace-Murray Corp.,10 the arbi-
trator viewed the role of the steward very differently. In this case there was
a concerted refusal by workers to fill out cards as ordered by the company.
The steward indicated that he took part in the non-compliance with company
instructions. The arbitrator found that although the concerted refusal to fill
out the cards violated a ban on "self-help," the steward's action was "the
individual action of [a member of the union]."10 3  The local union was not
to be held responsible for his actions. The request for damages was denied.
expenses and general loss of profits. Damages were awarded in the amount of $402.60.
'(9) In another case, Publishers Ass'n of N.Y.C., 39 Lab. Arb. 564 (1962), in-
volving the New York Times, a stoppage was called without the knowledge or consent
of the Newspaper and Mail Deliverers Union and the union business agent attempted
to end the wildcat as soon as he heard about it. Because the walkout was in violation
of the agreement, the arbitrator awarded actual damages of $1,029.00. He denied re-
quested liquidated damages.
(10) A somewhat novel award was issued in Belmont Smelting & Refining Works,
Inc., 50 Lab. Arb. 691, 696 (1968). Local union officers had called a wildcat strike
after a worker was given an indefinite suspension for striking a plant guard. The
company sought both punitive and compensatory damages for the losses suffered be-
cause of the walkout. The arbitrator ruled that the stoppage was a clear violation of
the no-strike clause. The requested damages were "denied without prejudice to a re-
newal thereof during the term of the collective bargaining agreement of the parties in
the event that the Company is subjected to any further violations" of the no-strike
clause. He ruled that the denial of the requested damages would be final at the end of
the contract period if there were no further unauthorized stoppages during the life of
the agreement. In explaining the reason for the award, the arbitrator stated: "In
plain and blunt language, it is the purpose and intendment of this award to have the
memory of August 15, 1967 [the date of the beginning of the wildcat strike] like
Banquo's Ghost, long persist-so that it just doesn't happen again."
100. 34 Lab. Arb. 607 (1960). In this case the arbitrator, although denying dam-
ages, sustained the discharge of the union steward for failure to report for scheduled
pre-shift overtime after the employer had sent him a telegram informing him of over-
time and advising him he would be held responsible and subject to discipline for failure
of the crew to report.
101. 43 Lab. Arb. 785 (1964).
102. 53 Lab. Arb. 1171 (1969).
103. id. at 1175.
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As is illustrated in some of the preceding cases, arbitrators who have been
asked to award damages have quite frequently not awarded damages be-
cause they felt the company failed to prove damages, or that there was di-
vided responsibility for the wildcat strike. An additional example is H. J.
Madore, Inc.,'0 4 where the arbitrator held that the employer was not entitled
to damages, since the violation of the contract by management had contrib-
uted to the strike.
Conversation with arbitrators has disclosed a number of instances in which
employers who have initially sought damages, have subsequently waived
these, feeling that this would best serve the long term interests of the com-
pany. One example is the Ingersoll-Rand Co. case' 05 where the Company
originally advanced a damage claim for $60,000 a day for a three day pe-
riod but subsequently withdrew this claim. The Bell Bakeries case' 06 also
concerns waiver of damages.
Unfair Labor Practice Charges:
The Roles of the NLRB and the Arbitrator
Since wildcat strikes are often triggered and sometimes prolonged by failure
to get an agreement on a disputed point, the union often alleges that the em-
ployer is not bargaining in good faith under Section 8 (a) (5) of the NLRA.1
07
The union may appeal formally to the NLRB, or simply make the allegation
to an arbitrator (assuming that the triggering case or the discipline for wild-
cat strike case goes to arbitration). In appealing to the NLRB unions often
allege unilateral change by the employer of incentive rates, or working con-
ditions, or disregard of past practice. Sometimes the employer is charged
with failure to furnish information.' 08  In protesting selective discipline,
unions sometimes allege violation of Section 8(a)(3).
The objective of the unions in asserting that the work stoppage is a protest
over an unfair labor practice by the employer is to prove that the stoppage is
not a violation of the no-strike clause. Unions find support for this position
in Mastro Plastics Corporation v. NLRB, 0 9 in which it was ruled that even a
no-strike clause was no bar to unfair labor practice strikes, unless it specifi-
cally includes such strikes. 110
104. 47 Lab. Arb. 698 (1966).
105. 50 Lab. Arb. 487 (1968).
106. 43 Lab. Arb. 608 (1964).
107. Id. at 609.
108. Such appeals could be made also in the absence of a wildcat strike, but we
are concerned here with those associated with a work stoppage. Samoff, The Case of
the Burgeoning Load of the NLRB, 22 LAB. L.J. 625 (1971).
109. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
110. In subsequent cases, the Board found that strikes over some unfair labor prac-
tices were not protected where the grievance could be settled by the grievance and ar-
1973]
Catholic University Law Review
Employers may also appeal to the NLRB alleging unfair labor practices by
unions during the wildcat strike sometimes citing Section8(b)(1) or Section
8(b)(4) of the NLRA.
If the same case is under consideration by both the NLRB and an arbitra-
tor, and the arbitrator has not rendered his award, the Regional Director of
the NLRB may await the ruling of the arbitrator, although he is not bound to
do so. He may issue a complaint and the trial examiner may make his de-
cision after a hearing. The NLRB may then decide whether it wishes to
make its own determination or wait. If the NLRB issues its decision before
the arbitration award, the arbitrator may or may not find the award pertinent
in his case. If the arbitrator makes his award in advance of the NLRB
disposition of the case, the NLRB retains power to examine the statutory
implications and also to interpret the contract in the case as it relates to un-
fair labor practices. However, the Board may decide to defer to the judg-
ment of the arbitrator. 111
The right of the NLRB to refuse to defer to an arbitrator's award is sup-
ported by the courts. 1 2 Usually, however, the NLRB will honor an arbitra-
tor's award if it meets certain standards set forth in the Spielberg Manufac-
turing Co. case,"13 which said that the proceedings were to be fair and regu-
lar, all parties were to agree to be bound, and the decision was not to be re-
pugnant to the purpose and policies of the NLRA."14
In the sample of arbitration cases analyzed only a very small number men-
tioned unfair labor practice charges or consideration by the NLRB of some
aspect of the case. In most of the cases the NLRB had either dismissed the
bitration procedures of the contract. Arlan's Department Store, 133 N.L.R.B. 802
(1961); Mid-West Metallic Products, Inc., 121 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1958), are cited in F.E.
Olds and Sons, 54 Lab. Arb. 30, 35 (1969). See also Thadeus Suski Prod., Inc. v.
Vola, 59 L.R.R.M. 2431 (1965).
111. There is an extensive literature on the subject of deferral, and on the broader
issue of whether arbitrators should remain strictly within the confines of the collec-
tive agreement, or should consider also all levels of law as well. The literature covers
the roles of the NLRB and the arbitrator in all kinds of arbitrable disputes, not just
those arising out of wildcat strikes.
See NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB AND THE
COURTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING (Washington, D.C. 1967),
at 47-110, and id. PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, at 83-93. See
also A.B.A., SECTION ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 480-515
(Washington, D.C. 1971).
112. See Steve's Sash and Door Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 430 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1970).
113. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
114. This policy was amplified in International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923
(1962). The general principle of deferral to arbitration is further supported by
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 150 (1971), discussed in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
LABOR, MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW, Vol. 94, No. 11 at 64-66 (1971).
An arbitrator with long experience in arbitration reports that he has had relatively
few cases in which there was an allegation of an unfair labor practice and in every
one of these the NLRB has sustained his decision.
[Vol. 22:279
Wildcat Strikes
unfair labor practice charge or held the case awaiting the arbitrator's deci-
sion. In none of the cases did the arbitrator find that an unfair labor prac-
tice had been committed. Some arbitrators ruled that the charges pending
with the NLRB were not before them. In one somewhat different case in-
volving a damage claim for a wildcat strike, the arbitrator ruled that a prior
NLRB decision awarding a disputed job to another union in the plant could
be disregarded in his deliberation since the Board considered outside factors
that were not before him.
115
Injunctions and Arbitration
Through a series of cases beginning with Lincoln Mills,116 the federal courts
were charged, in connection with Section 301 of the NLRA, with responsi-
bility for developing and enforcing a "common law of the shop." The Steel-
workers Trilogy"1 7 subsequently specified the role of arbitration and resolved
most questions of conflict between the arbitrator and the courts in favor of
the arbitral process. For example, an arbitrator's award, though it must be
based on the collective bargaining agreement, must be enforced by the
courts, even if the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract would differ from
the court's or be ambiguous.""
On the basis of the foregoing decisions unions were able to seek injunctions
to compel a reluctant employer to submit disputes arising during the term of
the agreement to arbitration, assuming the disputes involved an area subject
to the arbitration clause.
Employers confronted by an illegal work stoppage felt that they should
have an equivalent right to seek an injunction to compel the union to abide
by the no-strike clause and end the stoppage. While they did have the right
to seek damages in the courts after the fact, they thought this was not a satis-
factory substitute for an immediate halt to an illegal strike. Sometimes em-
ployers were able to get injunctions in state courts, depending on the law of
the particular state, but for a long period of time, three important Supreme
Court decisions stood in the way of such injunctions. In the Lucas Flour
case 1 9 the court ruled: "Incompatible doctrines of local law must give way
to principles of federal labor law."
115. The cases involved have been discussed elsewhere, under other topics. Phil-
ips Industries, Inc., 45 Lab. Arb. 943 (1965); F.E. Olds and Son, Inc., 54 Lab. Arb. 30
(1969); Reynolds Metals Co., 52 Lab. Arb. 936 (1969); Borden Ice Cream Co., 45
Lab. Arb. 1036 (1966); Mercer, Fraser Co., 54 Lab. Arb. 1125 (1970).
116. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
117. U.S.W. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); U.S.W. v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); U.S.W. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S. 593 (1960).
118. A.B.A., SECTION ON LABOR RELATION S LAW, supra note 111, at 482, has further
discussion and citations.
119. 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962). As asserted below this case is significant also be-
1973]
Catholic University Law Review
Shortly afterward, in the Sinclair case, 1 20 the Court held that the anti-in-
junction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act precluded a federal court
from enjoining a strike in breach of a collective bargaining agreement which
contained a binding arbitration clause and an explicit no-strike clause. The
majority opinion in Sinclair held that this decision was not in conflict with
congressional policy in favor of the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
grievance disputes because the employer's right to obtain and order compel-
ling arbitration was unimpaired.
Employers still wanted to supplement orders to arbitrate with injunctions
to end illegal work stoppages immediately. However, if they brought suits in
state courts, the union under the Avco decision of 1968121 could have them
removed to the federal courts, where they could be set aside by the Sinclair
ruling.
During the period in which the Sinclair decision governed some use was
made of "quickie arbitrations" in which the arbitrator was asked, if he found
a breach of the no strike clause, to direct the strikers to cease and desist.
The arbitrator's award could be enforced in the courts.
122
Boys Markets
In 1970 the Supreme Court, reversed Sinclair, in a 5-2 decision. In Boys
Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Local 770,123 the Court held that a federal dis-
trict court could issue an injunction against a strike where a collective bar-
gaining agreement contained a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitra-
tion procedure.
The background of the case is as follows: A dispute arose between a su-
permarket's frozen-foods supervisor and a union representative as to whether
cause it implied the existence of a no-strike clause, from the presence of an arbitration
clause. It should be noted that this case involved damages rather than an injunction.
The quotation from the Lucas Flour case continued:
• . . The dimensions of Section 301 require the conclusion that substantive
principles of federal labor law must be paramount in the area covered by the
statute.
Id. at 103. See Charles Dowd Box Co., Inc. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
120. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
121. Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
122. A.B.A., SECTION ON LABOR RELATIONS, supra note 111, at 450-51 cites Ruppert
v. Engelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129 (1958), and refers to a general discussion
of cases supporting arbitration awards which granted injunctive relief, in BERSTEIN,
PRIVATE DIsPuTE SETTLEMENT 601-40 (1968). See Edwards & Bergman, supra
note 94 at 14-15.
123, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). Justice Brennan, the principal dissenter in Sinclair,
wrote the majority opinion. Justice Stewart, who had subscribed to the Court's
decision in Sinclair, changed his position and concurred in Boys Markets. Justice
Black, joined by Justice White, dissented. Justice Marshall did not participate.
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work in frozen foods cases was bargaining unit work. The complaint came
within the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract. Under the
agreement either party could demand arbitration. The union went on strike
over the issue and refused arbitration. The company sought a temporary
restraining order in a California court. Through the union's removal to the
federal courts and appeals by the employer, the case eventually reached the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's injunction and
order to arbitrate. In so doing the Supreme Court emphasized the fact that
the employer was ready to proceed to arbitration at the time he asked for the
restraining order, and that the district court had found that the employer had
suffered and would continue to suffer irreparable damage. 124  The Court
said:
Our holding in the present case is a very narrow one . . . We
deal only with the situation in which a collective bargaining con-
tract contains a mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration pro-
cedure.' 25
The Court set forth principles for the guidance of district courts in deciding
whether to grant injunctive relief. The district court was not to issue an in-
junction against concerted activity " . . . unless and until it decides that the
case is one in which an injunction would be appropriate despite the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.' 1 26 It had to determine whether the strike was over a greiv-
ance which both parties were contractually bound to arbitrate. The Court
specified that the employer should be ordered to arbitrate as a condition of
obtaining the injunction, and that the court should consider the ordinary prin-
ciples of equity: the breaches threatened or occurring, the extent of irrepara-
ble injury to the employer, and " . . . whether the employer will suffer more
from the denial of the injunction than will the union from its issuance.' 127
The Supreme Court's opinion explained its reasons for overturning the Sin-
clair decision and for accommodating the seemingly absolute terms of the
Norris-La Guardia Act with Section 301 of NLRA.
The Court reviewed the past history of the Norris-La Guardia Act and in-
dicated that the Act was directed at a different type of situation. The in-
junctive relief allowed in the Boys Markets case is
a remedial device that merely enforces the obligation that
the union freely undertook under a specifically enforceable agree-
ment to submit disputes to arbitration.
128
124. Id. at 253-54.
125. Id. at 253.
126. Id. at 254.
127. Id. at 254.
128. Id. at 252.
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The decision was expressed in terms of encouraging the use of arbitration:
. . .Sinclair stands as a significant departure from our other-
wise consistent emphasis on the congressional policy to promote
the peaceful settlement of labor disputes through arbitration.
* . [I]n light of developments . . . it has become clear that
the Sinclair decision does not further but rather frustrates reali-
zation of an important goal of our national labor policy.
12 9
It was for this reason that it was reversed.
1. Scope of Boys Markets Decision
Commentators on the Boys Markets decision emphasize that a number of is-
sues remain unsolved.130  The first is the respective roles of federal and state
courts in relation to injunctions for work stoppages in violation of an agree-
ment. In the opinion this question is discussed largely with respect to the ef-
fect of the A vco and Sinclair decisions, although Lucas Flour and its implied
uniformity is mentioned. However, the opinion also says that Congress evi-
dently took into account "a certain diversity [which] exists among the state
and federal systems."''1 In a footnote the opinion also refers to the existence
of "little Norris-La Guardia Acts" in 14 states 3 2 but is silent as to the influ-
ence of this decision as a precedent in state courts. 133
Commentators seem to expect an increase in the number of injunctions
against wildcat strikes granted in state courts. Information obtained from
interviews also shows that an increasing number of injunctions have been
granted since the Boys Markets decision, particularly in coal industries.1
34
2. Scope of the Clauses
Commentators also stress the importance of the terms of the grievance and
arbitration clauses. The Boys Markets decision specified the presence of
"mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedures," and said the
district court could not issue an injunction unless it finds that the strike "is
over a grievance which both parties are bound to arbitrate.' 3 5 It is not clear
whether both parties must be able to initiate grievances, as they were in the
Boys Markets case.
129. Id. at 241.
130. Id. at 249.
131. Id. at 246.
132. Id. at 247 n.15.
133. Id.
134. Cassel, The Labor Injunction to Enforce No-Strike Provisions, 22 LAn. L.J. 234
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Cassel].
135. 398 U.S. 235 at 253.
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The "adjustment and arbitration" clause in Boys Markets was very broad,
covering:
any and all matters of controversy, dispute or disagreement, of
any kind . . . in any way involving the interpretation or applica-
tion of. . . this Agreement.
13 6
There was also a strong no strike clause.
The decision does not deal with a situation where the area covered by the
grievance or arbitration procedure is narrower, and certain subjects are ex-
cluded.
If a no-strike clause was omitted, it seems probable that the precedent of
Lucas Flour Co.'3 7 would be followed. In this case it was held that if dis-
putes are being arbitrated, the agreement:
gives rise to an implied promise by the union not to strike during
the period of the contract in response to these arbitrable dis-
putes.
13 8
It seems clear that both unions and management will give increasing atten-
tion to the coverage of these important clauses and consider the effect they
have on availability of injunctions for breaches of the agreement when they
bargain on a new agreement.
3. Effect of the Boys Markets Decision on the Role of the Arbitrator
Some arbitrators with whom the authors talked said that they approved the
Boys Markets decision. They agreed with the reasoning given in the opinion
that Sinclair had frustrated arbitration while the Boys Markets decision end-
ed the work stoppage which was delaying the arbitration and made arbitra-
tion a condition of granting the injunction.
Other arbitrators focused their attention on the possible impact of the de-
cision on procedural aspects of arbitration in those relatively few cases in
which injunctions are issued under the Boys Markets case. Since injunctive
orders are extraordinary relief, they predicted that the courts would require
immediate and expedited arbitration. This would put pressure for speedy
hearings on arbitrators, many of whom already have crowded calendars.
Some of the principles laid down for the federal district court to follow in
granting injunctions might lead to closer examination by courts of the con-
tract terms and the facts of the case which triggered the stoppage than has
been customary since the Trilogy.
136. Id. at 238 n.3.
137. Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
138. Cassel 235, and ANDERSON, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE AND THE ARBITRATION
CLAUSE, PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONFER-
ENCE ON LABOR, 1970, 225, at 244 (Christensen, ed. 1971).
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. Some arbitrators have also said that if the arbitration is being conducted in
conjunction with a pending court proceeding, it might be expected that the
courts would be much more willing to scrutinize the arbitral process. They
predict that there will have to be accommodation between courts and arbitra-
tors so that each process does not intrude on the other. 139
Minimizing the Incidence of Wildcat Strikes
From the arbitration cases studied and from interviews conducted in connec-
tion with the preparation of this article, a number of points emerge concern-
ing reducing the number of wildcat strikes. Those will be analyzed from the
standpoint of the union, on the one hand, and the company on the other.
In many international unions, international officers are strongly in support
of observance of the no-strike clause. The same is true of many local union
officials. (In certain unions, the United Mine Workers for example, there is
not the opposition to "self-help" that there is in many other unions. As noted
above, there is increasing use of the injunction to end wildcat strikes in cases
involving these unions.)
What have unions at the national and local level done to encourage ob-
servance of the no-strike clause? In an interview with a retired official of the
United Cement, Lime and Gypsum Workers International Union, the impor-
tance of international union control of strike funds was stressed. Strike bene-
fits may be paid only when approved by the international, and this approval is
withheld when there is a wildcat strike. The official stated that this was of
considerable importance in discouraging wildcat strikes, which have virtually
disappeared in the cement industry. Officials in the union stress with rank
and file workers the danger to the union of damage suits, if they hear rum-
blings concerning possible wildcat strikes. Education of shop stewards
through classes and handbooks is also important in inculcating respect for no-
strike clauses. At local union meetings, the importance of observance of the
no-strike clause is also stressed.
On the company side, much can be done to minimize the possibility of un-
authorized work stoppages. An official at the corporate level in the indus-
139. Martin Markson, a lawyer, writing in the LAB. L.J. deplores
the putting of the courts back into the business of enjoining strikes, even in
the limited area of strikes in violation of the no strike clause.
He believes that Boys Markets sacrifices the "core purpose" of the Norris-La Guardia
Act. He says that courts are
ill suited to the role of being administrators, even when the issue is breach of
the no-strike clause,
citing Warrior & Gulf on the need for expertise. He foresees a great deal of litigation
as to whether or not a contract has a "mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration
procedure." He would have preferred to retain the Sinclair prohibition, having it
operative at both federal and state levels, and to have "quickie" arbitrations.
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trial relations department of a large industrial firm stressed in an interview
the importance of good communications between top union and top company
officials. He stated that on occasion an international union officer would ad-
vise him that in one of the company plants a situation was developing which
might well lead to a wildcat strike. The company official would investigate
and not infrequently find that local management was creating the problem
which might lead to a stoppage. Since the situation was brought to the at-
tention of top management early, remedial steps could be taken promptly.
The causes of wildcats, indicate a number of areas where management can
reduce the possibility of violations of the no-strike clause by taking corrective
action. Poor working conditions, delay in the handling of grievances, faulty
communications between company and workers leading to the circulation of
unfounded rumors, and poor quality of supervision (including unnecessarily
harsh or profane language) have all been important factors triggering wildcat
strikes.
Summary
Prevention of wildcat strikes depends in considerable measure on improved
communication so that the tensions which frequently trigger wildcat strikes
will not mount. Workers who believe in immediate self help need to accept
the advantages of the grievance procedure which is already available to deal
with disputes. While the work stoppage lets off emotional steam and drama-
tizes grievances, it can result in excessive loss to the company, very severe
penalties to the workers, and damage claims against the union, which were
not contemplated by the initiators of the walkout.
Observers of the disruption which results when wildcat strikes are a fre-
quent occurrence assign a high value to the grievance and arbitration proce-
dure. The workers who secured the early agreements containing these provi-
sions considered them a great gain for labor and in return they were willing
to accept the no-strike clause. It is significant that the British, who have for
many years experienced large numbers of wildcat strikes which have serious-
ly affected production, recently passed legislation designed to curb such
strikes by strengthening the collective agreement.
140
The general view of companies, unions, and arbitrators is that a violation
of the no-strike clause is a serious offense.
140. The British Industrial Relations Act 1970 makes it an unfair labor practice
to break a legally enforceable written agreement and provides a limited scale of
damages which could be awarded by a special court for such violation. It is still
possible however, for the parties (following a traditional British pattern) to agree that
their contract, in whole or in part, is not intended to be legally enforceable, but is
an agreement only between themselves.
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If one does occur, the employer has several options. He may choose not
to invoke the disciplinary aspects of the no-strike clause at the outset, but try
instead to work out with the union leadership an immediate return of the
workers without penalty. If the employer decides to impose discipline, he
may assess penalties against the leaders of the walkout and also against the
followers, if he chooses. When large losses result from the strike the employ-
er may seek damages either from an arbitrator or from a court. He may also
seek an injunction against the strike in a state court if the state law permits or,
following the Boys Markets decision of 1970, in a federal court.
The union officials can help their cause by taking immediate action to end
the stoppage and by using the grievance procedure. If steps of the grievance
procedure have been completed and the employer is reluctant to take the case
to arbitration (although provided in the contract), the union can seek an or-
der compelling arbitration. If an apparent impasse develops in solving the
triggering dispute, and it is covered by the grievance procedure, the union
sometimes files an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. The NLRB,
however, may delay action and wait for an arbitration decision. The steps
taken by both employer and union will depend both on the circumstances of
the case and also on the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
An arbitrator may be brought into the picture in various ways, but most
commonly either to rule on the triggering dispute if it is still unsettled, or to
review the penalties imposed for the wildcat strike. Much less often is he
asked to award damages. Since the Sinclair decision was reversed in 1970,
there is little need for "quickie arbitrations" seeking cease and desist orders
to end wildcat strikes.
The power of the arbitrator varies greatly between cases because of the dif-
ferences in the agreements under which he operates. In discipline cases, for
example, he is sometimes given wide latitude, while in others he is narrowly
circumscribed in what he can do.
Although there is no principle of stare decisis, and each case stands by it-
self, there are certain patterns which emerge from arbitrators' decisions. For
example, if the arbitrator finds that the disciplined employee did in fact lead
the work stoppage, there is a strong likelihood that the discipline (whatever
its nature) will be upheld. Penalties have been modified or revoked when
arbitrators find that the disciplined employee was not in fact an instigator of
the strike. While there have occasionally been exceptions to this, in general
it has been held by arbitrators that the union official has a greater duty than
the rank-and-file worker to prevent or to stop wildcat strikes.
Various procedural matters have been the subject of arbitration awards
and tend to establish procedural precedents.
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A study of some 220 arbitration awards issued between 1958 and 1971 and
dealing with discipline for wildcat strikes shows that in the large majority of
cases the discipline meted out was supported by the arbitrators. There was a
wide variety in the severity of the discipline handed down by the employer.
It ranged from warning notices through disciplinary layoffs for varying pe-
riods of time to discharge. While only one or at most very few workers were
disciplined in most cases, there have been some cases in which large numbers
of workers have been discharged or otherwise disciplined.
In connection with these statistics, it should be pointed out that only a por-
tion of the cases in which some question about discipline for the work stop-
page is raised come to arbitration. Not all arbitration cases are submitted to
reporting agencies, and not all submitted cases are published. Nevertheless,
the authors feel that the sample of 220 cases over a period of about 13 years
is reasonably representative of the awards of arbitrators in general. The high
percentage of awards supporting the company discipline arises, in considera-
ble part, from the fact that arbitrators, since they deal with interpretation of
contracts, necessarily believe in the sanctity of contracts and so view wildcat
strikes as serious contract violations. Such violations are usually considered
by arbitrators as "just cause" for whatever discipline the company has im-
posed. When company-imposed discipline is modified or reversed, it is usual-
ly because (1) the arbitrator has found as a fact that the disciplined worker
was not guilty of the offense with which he was charged, or (2) that there has
been inconsistent discipline imposed on the worker, and the penalty is too se-
vere.
In a considerable number of cases arbitrators have awarded monetary dam-
ages for wildcat strikes, most frequently in newspaper and construction in-
dustries in our sample.
The Boys Markets case decided by the Supreme Court in 1970 appears to
have increased the use of injunctive relief as a way of dealing with wildcat
strikes. In this decision the Court accommodated the Norris-La Guardia Act
and Section 301 of the NLRA to permit federal courts to issue such orders
when they find that the dispute "is over a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate," and that the contract contains "a manda-
tory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure." Because of these speci-
fied conditions management and union will find it important to give increased
attention to the language of the pertinent clauses and the area which they wish
to cover by these procedures in their agreements.
It is to be hoped that greater understanding between the parties will reduce
the number of wildcat strikes and, when any occur, union leaders will coop-
erate to end them and to resolve differences by the machinery already pro-
vided in the agreement.
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